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The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the Principles and Objectives 
of the CCP
ANGELOS DIMOPOULOS∗
Abstract. The Lisbon Treaty brings signifi cant changes to the orientation of the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP), affecting the principles and objectives that guide the exercise 
of EU competence in this fi eld. Building upon the EC Treaty (TEC), it strengthens the role 
of uniformity and the commitment of the EU towards gradual liberalization, incorporating 
in fact a standstill obligation of the EU to retain the existing level of liberalization. More 
importantly, the Lisbon Treaty signals the integration of the CCP into EU external rela-
tions, providing common objectives and principles that allow for a re-evaluation of the 
objective of liberalization and the pursuance of other trade and non-trade goals, guarantee-
ing at the same time unity and consistency in the exercise of Union powers.
I Introduction
Since the establishment of the European Community (EC), the Common Com-
mercial Policy (CCP) has been widely regarded as the most important fi eld of EU 
external relations, presenting a unique tool for forwarding policy priorities that 
extended beyond pure trade considerations. The CCP remained a fi eld of greater 
importance even after the gradual expansion of Community powers in other exter-
nal relation fi elds, not only because of the wide scope and the nature of Community 
competence in the fi eld, but also because of its suitability to promote and integrate 
a variety of policy objectives in international relations with third countries.
Bearing in mind its importance, it may be expected that the CCP was the most 
clearly defi ned EU policy in terms of the principles it adheres to and the objec-
tives it pursues. However, the provisions of the EC Treaty (TEC) remained to a 
large extent silent regarding the orientation of the CCP. The Treaty amendments 
in Amsterdam and Nice concerned the scope of the CCP, while the extensive juris-
prudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was primarily focused on the 
scope and exclusive nature of Community competence in the fi eld.
Against this background, the Lisbon Treaty introduces signifi cant changes 
regarding the orientation of the CCP. Establishing a common set of principles and 
objectives governing all EU external action, it requires that EU action taken in the 
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fi eld of the CCP shall be based upon and promote the general principles, adhering 
at the same time to the specifi c principles and objectives of the CCP.
This article aims to identify the legal framework created by the Lisbon Treaty 
with regard to the principles and objectives of the CCP. In order to assess the 
signifi cance of the changes, this article examines fi rst the previous legal regime, 
focusing on the principles of uniformity and liberalization that were provided in 
the TEC. Afterwards, this article examines how the Lisbon Treaty affects the ori-
entation of the CCP, looking at its effect on the specifi c principles of uniformity 
and liberalization, the establishment of general principles and objectives relevant 
for the CCP, and fi nally how the balance is struck between the general objectives 
and the specifi c objectives of the CCP.
II The Principles and Objectives of the CCP under the TEC
The TEC provided limited assistance for identifying the principles and objectives 
of the CCP. Articles 131 and 133 TEC provided that the CCP was ‘based on uni-
form principles’ and ‘aims to contribute to the harmonious development of world 
trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and the low-
ering of standards’. Hence, the TEC text identifi ed uniformity and liberalization 
as the guiding principles and objectives determining the exercise of Community 
powers in the fi eld of the CCP.
1. The Principle of Uniformity
The principle of uniformity has been a major characteristic of the CCP throughout 
its evolution, refl ecting in external relations the common interests of the EU and 
the needs of the internal market. Aiming to protect the unity of the common market 
by avoiding distortions in competition and risks of trade defl ection that could arise 
if Member States pursued their individual external trade policies,1 the principle of 
uniformity required the adoption of common rules throughout the EU in the fi eld 
of the CCP.2 Besides the internal market imperative, the ECJ considered that uni-
formity was necessary to preserve the unity of the EU’s position with respect to 
third countries and to defend the ‘common interests’ of the EU. It is worth noting 
that the exclusive nature of Community competence in the fi eld arose as a result 
of the application of the principle of uniformity. The Court recognized the a priori 
1 Joined Cases 37 and 38/73, Sociaal Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders v. NV Indiamex et 
Association de fait De Belder [1973] ECR 1609; Opinion 1/78 [1979] ECR 2871, para. 45.
2 M. Cremona, ‘The External Dimension of the Internal Market’, in The Law of the Single 
European Market, ed. C. Barnard & J. Scott (Oxford: Hart, 2002), 351–394, at 354–355.
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exclusive character of EC competence in the fi eld of the CCP,3 which was justifi ed 
by the need to protect the unity of the common market.4
However, uniformity was an imperative only in areas of the internal market 
that had been fully harmonized so that common external rules were necessary for 
the proper functioning of the internal market.5 Even with regard to trade in goods, 
where the need for uniformity has been fi rmly established,6 the substantive devia-
tions from the establishment of common rules in the internal market were refl ected 
in the CCP. For example, different national standards applied to imports from 
third countries concerning their taxation, to the extent that indirect taxation of EU 
products was subject to different national rules.7 The link between uniformity and 
internal market harmonization was better illustrated in the areas of trade in ser-
vices and intellectual property (IP) rights, where full harmonization existed only 
to a limited extent. The preference granted to the techniques of mutual recognition 
and minimum harmonization in these areas indicated that uniformity played only a 
subsidiary role, rendering common rules necessary only to the extent that a mini-
mum level of common standards existed internally in the same area of law.8
The link between the CCP and the internal market did not imply that the applica-
tion of the principle of uniformity required that the CCP aimed at the achievement 
of the same objectives that existed in the internal market, namely non-discrimina-
tion and elimination of all trade barriers. The Court has clearly recognized that 
there is ‘no general principle obliging the Community, in its external relations, to 
accord to non-member countries equal treatment in all respects’.9 Consequently, the 
Community could discriminate not only between its own and third-country prod-
ucts, producers, or service providers, but also between third countries themselves, 
based on the common Community interest.10 However, the lack of a TEC-based 
obligation of non-discrimination did not mean that the discriminatory treatment of 
third-country products and service providers was always allowed. The equal treat-
ment of third-country products and service providers with EU-originated products 
and EU nationals was required by the TEC, insofar as such equal treatment was 
necessary for the proper operation of internal market rules, such as in the case of 
3 Opinion 1/75 [1975] ECR 1355; Case C-41/76, Donckerwolke [1976] ECR 1921; P.  Koutrakos, 
EU International Relations Law (Oxford/Portland: Hart, 2006), 13–17.
4 Cremona, n. 2 above, 357–358; G. Marin Duran, ‘Development-Based Differentiation in the 
European Community’s External Trade Policy: Selected Issues under Community and International 
Trade Law’, EUI PhD Thesis (Florence, 2008), 25–26.
5 Cremona, n. 2 above, 359–370; Marin Duran, n. 4 above, 23–24.
6 See n. 1 above.
7 Case C-228/90, Simba SpA [1992] ECR I-3713.
8 Cremona, n. 2 above, 374.
9 C-52/81, Faust v. Commission [1982] ECR 3745, para. 25; see also S. Peers, ‘Constitutional 
Principles and International Trade’, European Law Review 24 (1999): 185–195.
10 M. Cremona, ‘Neutrality or Discrimination? The WTO, the EU and External Trade’, in The EU 
and the WTO Legal and Constitutional Issues, ed. G. de Burca & J. Scott (Oxford/ Portland: Hart, 
2001), 151–184, at 165–172.
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the assimilation of third-country products with EU-origin products after they are 
put in free circulation.11 Second, obligations of equal treatment of third-country 
products/nationals were located outside the TEC, either in World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) law or in bilateral Community agreements. However, in such cases 
equal treatment was a result of international law obligations of the EC, which were 
freely adopted in the framework of the CCP in accordance with the policy priori-
ties set by the EC political institutions.
Consequently, the principle of uniformity had only ‘instrumental’ value, deter-
mining the areas of the CCP where common rules must be adopted. In areas that 
were not harmonized internally, uniformity was no longer an imperative but merely 
a tool that could be used by Community institutions.12 Furthermore, the principle 
of uniformity was ‘neutral’ with regard to the substantive orientation of the CCP. 
It did not impose an obligation of equal treatment or liberalization similar to the 
internal market but granted almost absolute discretion to the empowered Commu-
nity institutions to pursue the objectives that according to them served in the best 
way the Community interest.
2. The Objective of Liberalization
The only substantive objective that was provided in the TEC and could affect the 
content of the CCP was trade liberalization. Article 131 TEC recognized that the 
CCP aimed at liberalization of world trade through the progressive abolition of 
trade restrictions. However, liberalization was only as an aspirational aim, unlike 
the legally binding obligation of creating uniform rules. Article 131 TEC did not in 
itself impose an obligation on the Community either to liberalize trade unilaterally 
or to mirror internal trade liberalization at the external level.13 In fact, the Court 
verifi ed the non-binding nature of the liberalization objective, emphasizing that it 
establishes an objective rather than imposing an obligation.14 It lay in the discre-
tion of the political institutions to assess whether and to what extent CCP measures 
achieved trade liberalization.15
Consequently, liberalization constituted only an aspirational objective that 
offered guidance to the political institutions in the formation of the CCP. It pro-
vided only one possible policy orientation, the specifi c application of which lay in 
the hands of the Community institutions, which should assess whether a liberal-
izing policy would advance the Community interest. It was precisely the determi-
nation of the ‘Community interest’ that affected the orientation of the CCP, which 
11 Case C-41/76, Donckerwolke, n. 3 above; Marin Duran, n. 4 above, 37–38.
12 Cremona, n. 2 above, 374.
13 Case C-51/75, EMI v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd [1976] ECR-811.
14 Case C-150/94, United Kingdom v. Council (Chinese Toys) [1998] ECR I-7235, para. 67; Case 
C-112/80, Dürbeck v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt [1982] ECR 1251, paras 10–11.
15 Cremona, n. 2 above, 382–384.
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could pursue other trade objectives than liberalization. In that regard, other policy 
objectives could infl uence the content of the CCP, while liberalization did not take 
precedence over them.
3. Non-trade Objectives of the CCP and the Need for Consistency
Trade policy could pursue objectives other than trade liberalization. The lack of 
a defi nition of the content of the CCP in the TEC had led to controversy concern-
ing the types of trade measures that fell within the scope of the CCP.16 At a time 
when the TEC lacked specifi c provisions granting competence to the Community 
in specifi c fi elds, such as environmental protection or development cooperation, 
the Court endorsed a broad and instrumental approach to the concept of the CCP, 
so that any type of trade measures would fall under the scope of the CCP.17 In that 
respect, the CCP had been used for the adoption of trade measures pursuing objec-
tives other than regulating trade fl ows and trade restrictions, linked for example 
with environmental protection and development cooperation.18
The introduction of specifi c legal bases granting competence to the Community 
to take external action in specifi c fi elds had a signifi cant impact on the use of the 
CCP for pursuing non-trade objectives. For example, the introduction of Article 
175 TEC on environmental protection and Article 177 TEC on development coop-
eration led to numerous legal battles concerning the choice of the proper legal 
basis for the adoption of a specifi c measure.19 Bearing in mind that the different 
Treaty Articles provided different rules on the nature of EC competence as well 
as on decision-making and may provide specifi c  guidelines to the political institu-
tions concerning the exercise of EC competence, the choice of legal base became 
extremely important.
The Court, adopting an aim and content test in order to defi ne the proper legal 
basis,20 reaffi rmed in most instances the role of the CCP for the adoption of measures 
pursuing non-trade objectives, in particular in cases where a Community measure 
16 For an analysis of the type of trade measures falling within the scope of the CCP, see 
P. Koutrakos, ‘Legal Basis and Delimitation of Competences’, in EU Foreign Relations Law – 
Constitutional Fundamentals, ed. M. Cremona & B. de Witte (Oxford/Portland: Hart, 2008), Ch. 5.
17 See Opinion 1/78, n. 1 above; Opinion 1/75, n. 3 above; Case C-54/86, Commission v. Council 
(GSP) [1987] ECR I-1493.
18 For example, Art. 133 TEC was used as a legal basis for the conclusion of the Energy Star 
Agreement, which concerns the coordination of energy-effi cient labelling programmes for offi ce 
equipment, thus pursuing an environmental protection objective as well.
19 See Opinion 2/00 [2001] ECR I-9713; Case C-281/01, Commission v. Council [2002] ECR 
I-12049; Case C-94/03, Commission v. Council [2006] ECR I-1; Joined Cases C-317 and 318/04, 
Parliament v. Council [2006] ECR I-4721.
20 The Court has insisted that the choice of a legal basis must rest on objective factors, amenable 
to judicial review, Case C-54/86, GSP case, n. 17 above, para. 11.
THE EFFECTS OF THE LISBON TREATY 157
had more than one purposes or a twofold component.21 Within this framework, the 
Court recognized the need to use the CCP for the adoption of trade measures pursu-
ing other objectives without however clarifying the interaction between trade and 
non-trade objectives, their legal value and whether, how, and by whom they should 
be prioritized.22 Discussing only the procedural issues concerning the choice and 
combination of legal bases, the Court avoided to interfere with the substantive 
policy choices taken by the legislative and executive organs of the Community.
Consequently, the CCP could be used for advancing non-trade objectives found 
elsewhere in the TEC. In that respect, the need for coherence and consistency in 
the formation and application of the CCP appeared particularly important. Indeed, 
the role for coherence and consistency was stressed in the initial provisions of the 
old Treaty on the European Union in Article 3, while the TEC provided general 
principles and institutional guarantees that were valuable for ensuring coherence 
and consistency in the formation of the CCP as well as its integration within EC 
external relations. Considering the importance of coherence and consistency for 
EU action in the fi eld of the CCP after the Lisbon Treaty, these principles are ana-
lysed below, in light of their value after the amendments inserted by the Lisbon 
Treaty.
III The Orientation of the CCP in the Lisbon Treaty
The Lisbon Treaty introduces signifi cant changes in EU external relations, includ-
ing the CCP. Apart from amending the scope and nature of Union competence in 
the fi eld of the CCP, the examination of which goes beyond the scope of this arti-
cle,23 the Lisbon Treaty has remarkable effects on the principles and objectives of 
the CCP. First, the Lisbon Treaty creates in Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU a common 
framework for EU external action, thus subjecting all fi elds of formerly EC and 
EU external action to the same common general principles and objectives. Second, 
Article 206 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which 
substitutes Article 131 TEC, offers a different role to the objective of liberaliza-
tion in the fi eld of the CCP. Within this context, it is necessary to examine how the 
Lisbon Treaty affects the application of the principles of uniformity and liberaliza-
tion, the importance of the general objectives for the CCP, and the mechanisms it 
provides for ensuring coherence and consistency.
21 Case C-411/06, Commission v. Parliament and Council [2009] ECR I-0000, paras 45–46; Case 
C-178/03, Commission v. Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-107, paras 35 and 47.
22 See n. 17 above.
23 On the scope and nature of Union competence after Lisbon, see indicatively M.  Krajewski, 
‘External Trade Law and the Constitutional Treaty: Towards a Federal and More Democratic 
Common Commercial Policy?’, Common Market Law Review 42 (2005): 91–127. On the author’s 
views, see A. Dimopoulos, ‘The Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: Establishing Parallelism 




1. The Principle of Uniformity and the Objective of Liberalization
a) The Principle of Uniformity. The principle of uniformity remains at the heart 
of the CCP. Article 207 TFEU reiterates that ‘the CCP shall be based on uniform 
principles’. Uniformity holds its character as an instrumental principle of the CCP, 
providing a link between the exercise of internal powers and the type of external 
commercial measures.
The requirement of uniformity obtains further importance in light of the explicit 
recognition of the exclusive nature of Union competence in the fi eld of the CCP.24 
As was aforementioned, exclusivity was born as a corollary to uniformity, in order 
to secure the effective application of the EU-wide uniform measures. However, 
exclusivity was not extended to trade in services and IP, areas in which full harmo-
nization was achieved internally only to a certain extent.25 In that regard, the exten-
sion of exclusivity in the Lisbon Treaty to all areas covered by the CCP, namely 
trade in services, IP, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), requires a reconsidera-
tion of the role of uniformity in these fi elds, in particular with regard to their aspects 
that have not been harmonized internally.
It is arguable that the exclusive nature of the Union competence does not render 
mandatory the creation of uniform rules in all fi elds covered by the CCP. Similar 
to the current exceptions to uniformity with regard to trade in goods, the creation 
of uniform rules in the other areas of the CCP is necessary only to the extent 
that internal harmonization has been achieved. However, even though the Member 
States can no longer impose directly in these areas of law different rules con-
cerning third countries and their nationals, the Union, as the single actor in the 
fi eld, may recognize the different national interests and refl ect the policy choices 
of Member States. In fact, the requirement of unanimous voting in the Council 
for the adoption of CCP measures in the areas of trade in services, IP, and FDI, to 
the extent that unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules or insofar 
as trade in cultural and audiovisual services is concerned,26 indicates that Member 
States play indirectly a decisive role in the creation of common rules in these areas 
of the CCP.
b) The Objective of Trade and FDI Liberalization. The Lisbon Treaty alters sig-
nifi cantly the role of liberalization as an objective of the CCP. Article 206 TFEU 
defi nes liberalization in the same terms as Article 133 TEC, adding only a refer-
ence to other barriers to trade and FDI in order to refl ect the substantive scope of 
24 Article 3(1)(e) TFEU.
25 Article 133(5)(4) TEC provided that Member States retained their right to maintain and con-
clude international agreements with third countries, insofar as they did not confl ict with Community 
law or relevant international agreements. See C. Hermann, ‘Common Commercial Policy after Nice: 
Sisyphus Would Have Done a Better Job’, Common Market Law Review 39 (2002): 7–29, 19–20.
26 Article 207(4)(2) and (3) TFEU.
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Union competence.27 However, it substitutes the words ‘aims to contribute’ with 
stronger language, providing that the Union ‘shall contribute’ to trade liberaliza-
tion.
The change of the verb indicates that the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty intended 
to modify the aspirational character of the liberalization objective.28 First, the lin-
guistic difference between the words ‘aim’ and ‘shall’ indicates that liberalization 
is no longer a non-binding objective of the CCP, the pursuance of which rests in 
the hands of the Union political organs. On the contrary, Union institutions are 
bound to formulate the CCP in a way that has positive effects on trade and FDI 
liberalization.
The mandatory nature of the objective of liberalization becomes obvious, if 
Article 206 TFEU is compared with other provisions of the Treaties having a sim-
ilar wording with respect to the objectives of specifi c Union policy fi elds. For 
example, in the fi eld of development cooperation ex Article 177(2) TEC provided 
the exact same wording (shall contribute) regarding the objective of promoting 
democracy and rule of law. The mandatory nature of this objective was affi rmed 
by the Court in Portugal v. Council,29 where the Court noted that Article 177(2) 
TEC ‘requires the Community to take account of the objective of respect for human 
rights when it adopts measures in the fi eld of development cooperation’,30 and pro-
ceeded to interpret that obligation as implying that ‘development cooperation must 
be adapted to the requirement of respect for those rights and principles’.31 Draw-
ing a parallel to the conclusion of Portugal v. Council, there is little doubt that the 
objective of liberalization, as is identifi ed in Article 206 TFEU, is mandatory, and 
thus the legality of Union action could be compromised if a given CCP measure 
was found incompatible with that objective.
Assessing the limits of the discretion left to Union institutions when formulat-
ing the CCP, the normative content of the objective of liberalization is of particular 
importance. A careful reading of Article 206 TFEU indicates that the Union is 
committed to contribute to the gradual liberalization of trade and FDI. The Treaty 
text is clear that the Union is committed to the ‘progressive abolition of restric-
tions’ and the development of ‘harmonious world trade conditions’. Hence, Article 
206 TFEU does not require full liberalization of trade and FDI conditions, simi-
lar to the internal market, nor does it oblige the Union to proceed with unilateral 
27 Krajewski, n. 23 above, 107.
28 M. Cremona, ‘A Constitutional Basis for Effective External Action? An Assessment of 
the Provisions on EU External Action in the Constitutional Treaty’, EUI Working Paper Law 30 
(2006), 29.
29 Case C-268/94, Portugal v. Council [1996] ECR I-6177. For a discussion of the case, see 
S. Peers, ‘Fragmentation or Evasion in the Community’s Development Policy? The Impact of 
Portugal v. Council’, in The General Law of EC External Relations, ed. A. Dashwood & C.  Hillion 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), Ch. 7.
30 Case C-268/94, n. 29 above, para. 23.
31 Ibid., para. 24.
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liberalization of trade and FDI conditions. However, this does not mean that the 
 mandatory objective of liberalization is deprived of any normative value. On the 
contrary, contribution to gradual liberalization could be interpreted as binding the 
existing level of liberalization and prohibiting the adoption of restrictive measures. 
Such an interpretation would not only give value to the mandatory nature of the 
objective of liberalization, but it would also respect the wording of Article 206 
TFEU, which views liberalization as the progressive abolition of restrictions. The 
requirement that existing restrictions have to be gradually abolished indicates that 
a contrario a step back in liberalization is not permitted, as it would contravene the 
mandatory objective of pursuing further liberalization.
Consequently, the Lisbon Treaty emphasizes the commitment of the EU to the 
principle of liberalization, by rendering it a mandatory objective of its CCP. How-
ever, the binding nature of the objective of liberalization does not imply that the 
Union institutions lose their discretion concerning the determination of the extent 
and the means of liberalization. The CCP retains its fl exibility, allowing the politi-
cal organs to determine whether, when, and to what extent liberalizing measures 
advance the Union interest. However, the margin of appreciation given to the polit-
ical institutions is limited, as the Lisbon Treaty arguably obliges them to avoid 
taking any restrictive measures that affect the existing level of liberalization.
2. The General Principles and Objectives of EU External Action
a) The Constitutional Framework of EU External Relations Principles and Objec-
tives. One of the principal changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty in the fi eld of 
EU external relations was the creation of a common framework of principles and 
objectives for Union external action. Seeking to integrate the different external 
policies and enhance their consistent and effective application, the drafters of the 
Lisbon Treaty favoured the incorporation of specifi c principles and  objectives of 
EU external relations in primary law, establishing a common set of rules guiding 
the Union’s external policy making.32 The creation of this ‘quasi-constitutional’ 
framework of EU external action infl uences signifi cantly the CCP, as it creates the 
necessary legal foundations for coordinating the CCP with other external policies 
and for pursuing non-trade objectives through the adoption of CCP measures.
Principles and objectives of EU external action appear very early in the Trea-
ties, indicating the signifi cance of creating a common framework for EU external 
relations.33 Article 3 TEU includes among the values and general objectives of the 
32 M. Cremona, ‘The Draft Constitutional Treaty: External Relations and External Action’, 
Common Market Law Review 47 (2003): 1347–1366, at 1347–1350.
33 For the constitutional role of general principles and objectives as values in EU external rela-
tions, see M. Cremona, ‘Values in the EU Constitution: The External Dimension’, Workshop on 
Values in the EU Constitution (EUI, Florence, 2003).
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EU a paragraph concerning EU external relations, summarizing its main principles 
and objectives. It is worth noting that Article 3(5) TEU identifi es ‘free and fair 
trade’ as one of the basic objectives of EU external action, thus elevating the CCP 
into one of the fundamental fi elds of EU external relations and indicating its orien-
tation towards free and fair trade.34
Based on Article 3(5) TEU, Article 21 TEU presents the general framework of 
principles and objectives that determine EU external action. In contrast with the 
Constitutional Treaty, which provided a single chapter on EU external relations, 
the Lisbon Treaty places the general principles and objectives of EU external action 
in the TEU, just before the provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), while the rest of Union external policies are found in the TFEU. However, 
despite the abandonment of the single chapter structure, the Lisbon Treaty retained 
the substantive link between general principles and objectives and all fi elds of EU 
external relations.
The Treaties emphasize in more than one place the application of the general 
principles in the fi eld of the CCP. Being a provision on the values and objectives 
of the EU, Article 3(5) TEU applies in all fi elds of EU external relations. Further, 
paragraph 1 of Article 21 TEU concerns the action of the Union in the interna-
tional sphere, thus including all fi elds of Union external action, while paragraph 2 
expressly provides that the objectives it states apply ‘in all fi elds of international 
relations’. The third paragraph confi rms that the fi rst two paragraphs apply in Title 
V of the TFEU, which includes the CCP. The link between Article 21 TEU and the 
CCP is reaffi rmed in the TFEU as well. Article 205 TFEU establishes an express 
link between Article 21 TEU and the external policies found in the TFEU. In addi-
tion, Article 206 TFEU explicitly incorporates the general principles and values 
found in Article 21 TEU in the CCP.
A fi rst reading of Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU reveals that the list of principles 
and objectives of EU external action in reality incorporates principles and objec-
tives that were found in specifi c policy fi elds under the TEC.35 For example, the 
objective of sustainable development existed in Article 177 TEC on development 
cooperation. Hence, the Lisbon Treaty differentiates substantially from the previ-
ous regime in the sense that these principles and objectives apply not only with 
regard to the specifi c policy fi eld but also to all other fi elds of external relations, 
the CCP included.36
Consequently, Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU incorporate specifi c trade and non-trade 
principles and objectives, which guide the exercise of Union powers in the fi eld of 
the CCP. The pursuance of trade objectives is of utmost importance for determin-
ing the orientation of the CCP, as they shed further light on the role of trade and 
FDI liberalization under Article 206 TFEU. With regard to non-trade objectives, 
34 On the concept of free and fair trade and their link to liberalization, see ss II.2(b) and II.3(a).
35 Cremona, n. 28 above, 5.
36 Cremona, n. 32 above, 1349; Krajewski, n. 23 above, 107.
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Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU do not add in practice to the previous orientation of the 
CCP, as the pursuance of non-trade objectives has been already recognized by the 
ECJ.37 However, Article 21 TEU is of greater legal value, as it provides the legal 
foundation for the pursuance of non-trade objectives in the fi eld of the CCP.
b) Trade Objectives as General Objectives of EU External Action. Recognizing 
the importance of trade policy, Articles 3(5) and 21(2)(e) TEU make explicit ref-
erences to trade objectives as general objectives of EU external relations. They 
provide that the Union shall contribute to ‘free and fair trade’ and pursue the ‘inte-
gration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive 
abolition of restrictions on international trade’. A careful reading of these provi-
sions indicates that the general trade objectives are not only limited to trade lib-
eralization, which is the only objective provided in Article 206 TFEU but include 
other trade-related objectives.
Closer to the objective of trade liberalization appears to be the objective stated 
in Article 21(2)(e) TEU. The progressive abolition of trade restrictions is explicitly 
recognized as an objective. However, trade liberalization as such is not an objec-
tive of EU external action of constitutional signifi cance, as it is linked with the 
broader objective of integrating third countries into the world economy. Given that 
the latter objective has been one of the objectives of development cooperation,38 
Article 21 TEU suggests that trade liberalization is the basic tool for serving a 
development objective. Hence, it is arguable that in Article 21 TEU the objective 
of trade liberalization obtains another dimension as it is placed under the umbrella 
of economic development.
The link between liberalization and economic and social development is 
strengthened even more in Article 3(5) TEU. The reference to free and fair trade 
indicates that pursuance of free trade, namely full liberalization of trade condi-
tions, is only the one side of trade policy objectives, which is complemented by 
fair trade. In contrast with free trade, diffi culties arise with the defi nition of the con-
cept of fair trade. On the one hand, fair trade can be perceived as conformity with 
international trade rules, so that the pursuance of fair trade is principally linked 
with non-breaching of WTO rules. On the other hand, fair trade can be perceived 
as ‘equitable trade’, namely trade linked with social and labour goals aiming at a 
fairer distribution of trade profi ts.39 As the Commission has put it, ‘the objective 
of fair trade is to ensure that producers receive a price that refl ects an adequate 
return on their input of skill, labour and resources, and a share of the total profi t 
commensurate with their input’.40 In that sense, fair trade is linked with social 
37 See n. 1 above.
38 Article 177(1) TEC.
39 On the concept of fair trade in EU external relations, see M. Cremona, ‘Free and Fair Trade’ 
(forthcoming, to be added at proof stage).
40 European Commission, ‘Commission Communication on Fair Trade’, COM 619 (Brussels, 29 
Nov. 1999), 4.
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 development objectives both with respect to internal producers/service providers 
and third-country nationals. Hence, even though there is no consensus on the con-
cept of fair trade, it is undeniable that the reference to free and fair trade in Article 
3(5) TEU adds another (trade) objective of fundamental value to the CCP.
c) The General Principles and Objectives of EU External Action as Non-trade 
Objectives of the CCP. Turning now to the specifi c non-trade principles and objec-
tives that are provided in Article 21 TEU, it is important to categorize them and 
underline the ones that are of greater practical value for the orientation of the CCP. 
Starting with the principles of democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights, 
as well as the Union’s security and integrity and the preservation of international 
peace and security, which the Union shall ‘seek to advance’ and ‘consolidate and 
support’, the reference to these objectives is of greater importance for the formal 
recognition of the legality of the use of positive and negative conditionalities.41 
Article 21 TEU legitimizes the current practice of inserting positive and negative 
conditionality clauses in trade agreements and granting trade preferences to coun-
tries adhering to these objectives, as it recognizes that trade measures can be used 
for the pursuance of the Union’s security, human rights, and democracy policy.42
Continuing with an equally important objective for the orientation of the CCP, 
Article 21 TEU provides that the Union shall work in order to ‘help develop inter-
national measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the 
sustainable management of global natural resources’. Environmental protection is 
explicitly recognized as an objective of EU external action, pursuant to the general 
recognition of environmental protection as an objective that must be integrated 
into all Union policies, according to Article 11 TFEU (ex Article 6 TEC).43 As a 
result, Article 21 TEU enhances the importance of environmental goals as non-
trade objectives of the CCP. In addition, the explicit recognition of sustainable 
economic, social, and environmental development of developing countries as a 
general objective of EU external action places on a different basis the relation 
between trade and development cooperation. Similar to environmental protection, 
Article 21 TEU incorporates the need of integrating development cooperation in 
all other EU external relation fi elds, thus rendering the principle enshrined in for-
mer Article 178 TEC of fundamental value.44
41 Cremona, n. 28 above, 30.
42 On the pursuance of the objectives of human rights and democracy through trade conditionality, 
see L. Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005).
43 On the role of environmental protection in EU external relations, see G. Marin Duran & E. 
Morgera, ‘Towards Environmental Integration in EC External Relations? A Comparative Analysis of 
Selected Association Agreements’, Yearbook of European Environmental Law 6 (2006): 179–210.
44 On the role of Art. 178 TEC as incorporating development objectives in the Common 
Commercial Policy, see Marin Duran, n. 4 above, Chs 1 and 5.
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Last but not least, Article 21 TEU identifi es multilateralism and good gover-
nance as basic objectives of EU external action. The recognition of these  objectives 
plays a very signifi cant role for the orientation of the CCP. The objective of mul-
tilateralism indicates that the Union shall be committed to multilateral trade nego-
tiations and participate actively in institutions such as the WTO and promote and 
contribute to their effective operation. Further, the objective of good governance 
is strongly linked with the broader trade and development objectives. Good (trade) 
governance can be enhanced internally, which is linked with the objective of fair 
trade in the sense that the Union is committed to abide by international rules and 
avoid trade practices that breach its international commitments,45 and also exter-
nally, in the sense that the EU is required to assist third countries to develop their 
trade governance capacity.
d) The Legal Effects of the General Principles and Objectives. The recognition of 
the aforementioned principles and objectives as general objectives of EU external 
action does not necessarily imply that they have the same legal value as the spe-
cifi c objectives in each external policy fi eld. Articles 3 and 21 TEU use strong lan-
guage (shall), suggesting that the principles and objectives of EU external action 
oblige the Union to act within the framework they create. Their mandatory nature 
is softened, however, by their broad formulation. The Union is required to ‘con-
solidate and promote’ democracy, respect for human rights, and good governance, 
to ‘foster’ sustainable development, to ‘help develop’ environmental protection 
measures, and to ‘encourage’ integration in the world economy. Hence, the Lis-
bon Treaty leaves a great degree of discretion to the policy-making institutions 
to assess the means of action and the content of the chosen action.46 Articles 3(5) 
and 21 TEU impose arguably a justiciable obligation upon the EU institutions to 
pursue these objectives in the fi eld of the CCP as well, but it leaves them a wide 
margin of appreciation to determine when, whether, and how these objectives can 
be pursued.
Furthermore, the recognition of general objectives of EU external action impacts 
on the question of choice of legal basis for a specifi c EU measure. The choice of 
a proper legal basis remains important because of its institutional and competence 
implications.47 However, the test of aim and content needs to be reconsidered, 
since the Lisbon Treaty requires that the same general objectives must be pursued 
in all external policy fi elds. It could be argued that the ‘merge’ of objectives of EU 
external action renders defunct the fi rst limb of the test, so that only the content of a 
specifi c measure would determine the legal basis under which it should be adopted. 
45 See Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission 
on European Union Development Policy, The European Consensus, OJ C46/1 (Brussels, 22 
Nov. 2005).
46 Cremona, n. 28 above, 5–6.
47 Ibid., 7.
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Nevertheless, such argument misunderstands the role of the general objectives 
and overstates their practical effects. The recognition of  common  objectives is not 
 followed by a lack of specifi c objectives in each external policy fi eld. For example, 
the objective of trade and FDI liberalization exists in both Articles 21 TEU and 
206 TFEU, but in different terms concerning their scope. Hence, the identifi ca-
tion of the specifi c objectives in each policy fi eld can be used for determining the 
proper legal basis for each specifi c measure.
3.  Coherence and Consistency in the Pursuance of the Objectives of the CCP
As the pursuance of a general objective may confl ict with the specifi c objectives 
of the CCP as well as with other general objectives, it is necessary to examine 
whether the Lisbon Treaty provides rules concerning the balance between different 
objectives in the fi eld of the CCP. Bearing in mind that coherence and consistency 
in external action was the imperative for introducing the provisions on general 
principles and objectives, it is crucial to see how the general objectives link to 
the specifi c objectives of the CCP and to whom is their consistent application 
entrusted.
a) Balancing between Trade and FDI Liberalization and General Objectives
Starting with the balance struck between the general objectives and the specifi c 
objective of liberalization, we need to look at the links between the general objec-
tives and the CCP provided in the Treaties. As was aforementioned, both the 
TEU and the TFEU include a number of provisions concerning the application of 
Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU in the fi eld of the CCP, each of which has a different 
wording. While Articles 3(5), 21(3) TEU, and 205 TFEU clearly state that the 
Union ‘shall pursue’ the general objectives, Article 207(1) TFEU provides that 
‘the CCP shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of 
the Union’s external action’. Hence, Articles 3(5), 21(3) TEU, and 205 TFEU 
appear to suggest that the general objectives of EU external action are of overarch-
ing value so that the pursuance of the specifi c objectives in each policy fi eld is 
permitted to the extent that the overarching objectives are not frustrated. On the 
other hand, Article 207(1) TFEU appears to suggest that the general principles and 
objectives create only the general context, within which the specifi c objective of 
trade and FDI liberalization should be primarily pursued.48
Despite the lack of a clear prioritization, in practice a confl ict between different 
objectives will exist only if a specifi c measure pursuing a general objective is more 
restrictive than the existing level of liberalization. If the mandatory nature of the 
objective of trade and FDI liberalization is interpreted as prohibiting the adoption 
48 Cremona, n. 28 above, 30.
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of more restrictive measures,49 the pursuance of other general objectives that do not 
infl uence the current level of liberalization falls within the margin of appreciation 
left to the political institutions. However, in many instances the pursuance of general 
objectives may lead to restrictive measures. Given that the CCP does not have a pro-
vision similar to Article 36 TFEU (ex Article 30 TEC) and Article XX GATT allow-
ing exceptions to liberalization, even the adoption of specifi c restrictive measures in 
relation to a specifi c third country does not seem to be able to be accommodated under 
the general prohibition of adopting new restrictions. However, it is arguable that the 
adoption of restrictive measures pursuing general objectives is permitted, as other-
wise the recognition of the general objectives in the EU Treaties would be negated, 
since their pursuance would be severely limited in the fi eld of the CCP.
This does not mean that the objective of trade and FDI liberalization is deprived 
of its normative value. It is arguable that it is only the pursuance of the specifi c 
objectives provided in Articles 3 and 21 TEU that can lead to the adoption of 
restrictive measures. Of course the broad wording of most general objectives, and 
in particular the reference to fair trade, can be used for the adoption of a wide vari-
ety of restrictive measures. Nevertheless, Articles 3 and 21 TEU cannot be used 
for legitimizing purely protectionist measures. Fair trade, in the sense of equitable 
trade, could provide the only justifi cation for the adoption of protectionist mea-
sures, but even in these cases the existence of a strong link between protectionism 
and promotion of social development objectives should be demonstrated.
Furthermore, it can be argued that a two-tier test must be fulfi lled in order for 
a restrictive measure to be legitimate, so that it must not only pursue a general 
objective, but it must also be proportional. Similar to the internal market, the bal-
ance between free trade and other legitimate objectives can be based on a propor-
tionality test, so that only the restrictive measures that are suitable for ensuring 
the achievement of the objective pursued and do not go beyond what is necessary 
to attain that objective are permitted.50 Even though the Treaties do not directly 
impose the conduct of a proportionality test, its recognition as a necessary tool for 
balancing free trade and other objectives in the internal market51 indicates that it 
can be used in external relations as well, where similar, confl icting objectives are 
pursued. In this way, both the commitment of the EU towards progressive liberal-
ization is affi rmed and the pursuance of other, equally fundamental external rela-
tions objectives can be successfully achieved.
49 See s. II.1.(b).
50 On the role of proportionality for determining the exceptions to free movement of goods, see 
C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, the Four Freedoms (Oxford/New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 64–91.
51 In the cases of Viking (Case C-438/05 [2007] ECR I-10779) and Laval (Case C-341/05 [2007] 
ECR I-11767), the Court of Justice entered into a balancing exercise between internal market free 
movement provisions and social policy objectives, underlining the role of proportionality as an 
important step in determining the legitimacy of a measure pursuing a social policy objective that is 
restrictive of free movement rights.
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b) The Role of the Institutions. It has become obvious that the specifi c determina-
tion of the orientation of the CCP lies within the hands of the political institutions. 
Article 207 TFEU entrusts the Council and the Parliament with the determination 
of the framework for implementing the CCP, granting also a signifi cant role to 
the Commission, which is the main actor initiating Union action. It is worth not-
ing that the Lisbon Treaty changes drastically the institutional balance concerning 
decision-making in the fi eld of the CCP, rendering for the fi rst time the Parliament 
as a co-legislator.52
Guiding the political organs, the TEU provides institutional safeguards to 
ensure the coherent and consistent formation and effective application of the CCP. 
Article 21(3)(2) TEU emphasizes the importance of consistency, assigning this 
role to the Council, the Commission, and the High Representative (HR). These 
institutions shall ensure the avoidance of confl icts with other  policy fi elds and that 
the CCP pursues the general objectives determined in the Treaties in a coherent 
way. In addition, Article 22 TEU assigns this role also to the European Council, 
which granted the mandate to ‘identify the strategic interests and objectives of the 
Union’ in general and in each external policy fi eld, including the CCP.53
Hence, the Lisbon Treaty introduces new institutional actors and in particular 
the HR who can infl uence the orientation of the CCP. Its double function, acting 
as a Vice President of the Commission and as the institution responsible for the 
conduct of the Union’s CFSP, enables the HR to infl uence the formation of the 
CCP by participating in the Commission policy-making and by taking autono-
mous action. Considering that Article 18(4) TEU prioritizes between the roles of 
the HR so that in cases of confl icts of interests his/her role under the CFSP pre-
vails,54 the question arises whether this may lead to the pursuance of more CFSP 
objectives in the CCP. Although the Lisbon Treaty describes the mandate of the 
HR very broadly, it should not be expected that the HR will affect the orientation 
of the CCP more than ensuring coherence with the CFSP. His/her role as a Vice 
President of the Commission, responsible for external relations, does not mean that 
the HR substitutes other external relation Commissioners, but mainly that he/she 
ensures coherence and consistency between the different external relation direc-
torates of the Commission.55 Besides, the right to initiate external Union action 
independently from the Commission under Articles 215(1) and 218(9) TFEU (ex 
Articles 301 TEC and 300(2)(2) TEC), which provide for the adoption of trade 
restrictive measures and the suspension of application of Union  Agreements, 
52 On the changes concerning decision-making in the fi eld of the CCP, see Krajewski, n. 23 above, 
119–124.
53 Cremona, n. 32 above, 1349–1350.
54 M. Cremona, ‘Coherence through Law: What Difference Will the Treaty of Lisbon Make’, 
Hamburg Review of Social Sciences 3 (2008): 11–36, at 33.
55 Cremona, n. 54 above, 34; cf. Editorial Comment, ‘Mind the Gap’, Common Market Law 
Review 45 (2008): 317–322, at 318–319.
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 presents an explicit  expression of the HR’s role as ensuring coherence between 
the CFSP and the CCP, since these provisions have always incorporated the main 
instances where CFSP objectives are relevant for the adoption of EU action in the 
fi eld of the CCP.
Finally, it is worth underlining the role assigned to the ECJ for ensuring coher-
ence and consistency, balancing between different confl icting objectives and 
ensuring inter-institutional cooperation and cooperation between the EU and 
Member States. Considering the mandatory nature of the objective of trade and 
FDI liberalization and the general objectives of EU external action, a primary 
task of the ECJ would be to engage into a review of the legality of a specifi c CCP 
measure, determining whether it actually pursues the legitimate objective pro-
claimed and if it is proportional. However, the broad scope of the general objec-
tives leaves large discretion to the political institutions to determine how and 
whether a policy objective can be pursued. In light of the ECJ’s hesitance to inter-
fere with the policy options of EU institutions in external relations so far,56 only a 
marginal control of the exercise of the political discretion by the Court should be 
expected.
III Conclusions
This article illustrates that the Lisbon Treaty marks a new era for the orientation 
of the CCP. It signals the transformation of the CCP from an autonomous fi eld of 
EU external action, subject to its own rules and objectives, into an integrated part 
of EU external relations, characterized by common values that guarantee unity 
and consistency in the exercise of Union powers. Within this framework, uni-
formity and liberalization are no longer the only principles determining the for-
mation of the CCP. EU action in the fi eld shall take into account and pursue the 
general objectives of EU external relations, thus legitimizing the current practice 
of adopting CCP measures for achieving other trade and non-trade goals. In par-
ticular, the references to fair trade and integration to the world economy next to 
liberalization illustrate that trade liberalization should not be seen any longer as a 
self- determining objective, but it should be regarded within the broader context of 
economic and social development objectives.
In addition, the Lisbon Treaty introduces another, more radical change. It 
strengthens the commitment of the EU towards gradual trade and FDI liberal-
ization, incorporating in fact a standstill obligation of the EU to retain the exist-
ing level of liberalization. Bearing in mind the broader orientation of the CCP 
towards other potentially confl icting objectives, the task of balancing between 
56 For example in Portugal v. Council (n. 29 above) although the Court recognized the mandatory 
nature of the objective concerned, it did not deal with the question whether the essential elements 
clause was an adequate, well-suited, or necessary measure for achieving this objective.
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 liberalization and other objectives acquires a new dimension, as it is set on dif-
ferent  institutional foundations. Apart from the plurality of political organs that 
have a saying in the determination of the CCP, the role of the ECJ engaging into 
a review of the  legality of specifi c Union measures in light of the objectives they 
pursue is enhanced. Whether the Court will entrust the task of ensuring the coher-
ent and consistent application of CCP to the political institutions or it will take a 
more active role remains to be seen.
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